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Comment

By Roger C. Cramton

In talking about the social and
ethical responsibilities of the bar to
advance the public interest,1 there is
a danger that we may take ourselves
too seriously. I am told, on good authority, that the Arkansas Supreme
Court recently devoted its attention to
a subject which I last encountered in
law school some years ago-the rule
against perpetuities. One of the
judges, carried away with the intricacy and beauty of the problem before the court, inquired of counsel
whether a particular variation was
well known in his part of the State.
"Your Honor," the reply came, "in
Booneville we talk of little else."
I recall also the well-known "Daleyism" of the esteemed mayor of Chicago, made during dedication ceremonies of a new building at the University of Chicago in the late 1950's:
"together we will rise to new platitudes of achievement."
Abe Krash has made my task a difficult one in two respects: First, be
has carefully avoided the unctuous
and platitudinous. Second, my agreement with his position is so nearly
complete that lively criticism is extremely difficult.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to examine
the unarticulated premises that under-

lie Mr. Krash's view of the adversary
system of representation as part and
parcel of "the public interest."2 Therc
is an opposing view that deserves
statement, although I do not share it.
You will recall the celebrated confrontation between Ralph Nader and
Lloyd Cutler several years ago. Cutler's firm had represented automobile
companies that had been charged
with conspiracy to impede the development of emission control systems.
Settlement negotiations with the Justice Department resulted in a consent decree that ended the antitrust
action. Through Nader's promptings, a
group of law students picketed Cutler's firm to call attention to the settlement, which they characterized as
a sellout of the public interest. Cutler, visibly upset, accused the law students of violating legal ethics by
picketing, and asked the $64 question: "Why do you think you have a
monopoly on deciding what is in the
public interest?"
The traditional view of the bar, implicit in Cutler's statement, is that political and legal processes are fair and
open ones which provide orderly
methods of participation and change;
and that the duty of a lawyer is to
represent vigorously the interests of
Chicago Bar Record

HeinOnline -- 55 Chi. B. Rec. 40 1973-1974

his client. Whatever you or I may
think of the outcome of the pluralistic
political process in a given situation,
it is the only current expression of the
public interest. Thus, if the system
operated properly, without favoritism
or corruption, the pollution case settlement must have been "in the public
interest," since it was the outcome of
a process that is open, rational, and
fair.
This is an elaboration of the classical view of Bentham, who observed
that the public interest could be calculated simply by adding the individual interests of members of the
polity.3 To the calculus of private
interests, which are the essence of a
free society, must be added an emphasis on the fairness and openness of
our mechanisms and procedures for
resolving private and public controversies-mechanisms in which lawyers
play an indispensable role. Given fair
and open procedures for resolving disputes or urging social change, Learned
Hand concluded: "[R]ight conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues than through
any kind of authoritative selection. To
many, this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our
all."

4

Objections to the pluralist theory
rest upon disagreement with its factual or normative premises. 5
First, there is the assertion by some
that the procedures are not really fair
and open because of the existence of
widespread bias and favoritism, if not
corruption. Thus, for example, it is
charged that the case-hardened criminal court judge invariably accepts
even the implausible recital of the police officer; or that Southern judges
and juries could not be trusted in the

1960's to determine factual issues
fairly in civil rights cases. Here the
disagreement is one of fact: How pervasive are the warts of our system?
To what extent does it fail in practice
to live up to its pretensions? All of us
would agree, I hope, that imperfections of the system that take this form
should be eradicated as completely
and as early as possible.
A second objection to the pluralist
system-that the cards are stacked
against interests that are not economic
in character or that lack resourcesis one that Abe Krash has identified
and discussed as a major concern. I
would add only that this problem is
far more serious than one merely of
representation of the impoverished.
Interests other than those of the poor
may also be unable to obtain full and
adequate representation. Our political
process provides great access, leverage, and visibility to the leaders of
organized interest groups, whether
they be unions, corporations, professional groups, or private associations.
But these organizations tend to be organized as hierarchies in which the
leadership groups are self-perpetuating. There are limits on the extent
to which the rank-and-file can control
these organizations. 6 Thus, George
Meany does not necessarily represent
the views of the ordinary unionist, nor
Chesterfield Smith the views of all the
lawyers in this room. This limitation
of the system operates wholly apart
from its bias against unorganized interests and those of poor people.
Another problem of representation
concerns the diffused interest, whether
it be an economic or ideological one.
If I, as a consumer, am concerned
about the safety of tires, on which I
spend no more than $50 a year, there
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is very little that I am inclined to do
when it comes to legislation, regulation, or court proceedings involving
such issues. The expense of effective
participation is so great that I have to
be a crank or a zealot to devote the
required energy and money to such
participation. On the other hand, one
can be sure that interests that have a
great deal at stake, such as the tire
companies, will be fully and ably
represented. Of course, it is possible
for small interests to combine in supporting an institutional representative;
and the burgeoning number of consumer and environmental groups demonstrates that this can be done. But
the costs of combination are large; and
the "free rider" problem is serious.
Why should I contribute to a consumer organization concerned with
tire safety when others may do it anyway? It is imperfections of this sort
that lead thoughtful people to argue in
favor of public financing of consumer
or environmental advocates. But this
approach, with its departure from traditional attorney-client relationships,
also has difficulties, and I agree with
Mr. Krash that we are a long way
from seeing the clash of private interests become sufficiently even

handed so that the outcome routinely
may be said to be in the public interest. New and better devices for
more adequate representation of those
now underrepresented are badly
7
needed.
My comments thus far have been
fully consistent with the basic premises of the pluralist system, and have
merely emphasized its imperfections.
In the pluralist view, all competing
claims are merely subjective value
preferences-and Lloyd Cutler can
play the "public interest" game with
as much authority as Ralph Nader
(although he may have greater difficulty in attracting the attention of the
medial).
The radical critique of American society, however, does not accept the
premise that decisions made in accordance with the procedures of the
system will produce the best results
for the whole society. Herbert Marcuse and others argue that the
pluralist system produces irrational
and undesirable results. 8 The
competing institutions of modern industrial society, Marcuse claims, concur in a common interest to defend
and extend their established position,
and to solidify the "power of the
Chicago Bar Record
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whole over the individual." The irrationality of the whole goes unnoticed
and unprotested-growing productivity for little or no purpose; technological advances used to produce instruments of death or the plastic products
of a consumer society; increasing affluence resulting in moral emptiness and
environmental devastation. The radical critique, in short, does not accept
the assumption that ultimate values
can be determined by the conflict of
private interests. The radicals have
discovered truths, not self-evident to
the rest of us, that do not depend
upon the votes of the political process
or the advocacy and rationality of the
legal process. While the value choices
that are asserted are subjective, it is
also true that the preferences of the
rest of us for a procedural definition
of ultimate values is also ultimately
subjective. The difference for the moment is that the vast majority of our
society, and nearly the entire universe
of lawyers, accept the premises and
values of the pluralist system, It is the
accepted truth of our time. The radi-

cal critique, unable to muster a coherent and sustained vision of the
good society, but riven by discordant
and partial visions, is at present merely
a voice crying out in the wilderness.
FOOTNOTES

1. There is a substantial literature deal-

ing with the concept of "the public interest."
See generally, G. Schubert, The Public Interest (1960); Barry, The Public Interest, in
The Bias of Pluralism (W. Connolly ed.
1969).
2. See Riley, The Challenge of the New
Lawyers: Public Interest and Private Clients,
38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 547 (1970); Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79
Yale L. J. 1069 (1970).
3. See Bentham, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation 3-4
(1948).
4. United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y., 1943).
5. In this part of my discussion I have
relied heavily on an excellent student comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79
Yale L. J. 1069, 1070, n.3 (1970).
6. See H. Kariel, The Decline of American Pluralism (1961).
7. I have discussed this problem at
greater length in a recent article, The Why,
Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60
Geo. L. J. 525 (1972).
8. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man
xiii (1964); Moore, The Society Nobody
Wants: Beyond Marxism and Liberalism, in
The Critical Spirit 418 (1967).

Discussion

Q. I think that what we are missing
and what we really need today is the
example of a Louis DeBrandeis, who
a generation ago set out very intentionally to become a successful and
wealthy lawyer for one purpose-that
was to become an independent spirit
and turn his abilities to the representation of the public interest in Massachusetts. I think it would be great if
some of our successful and prestigious
lawyers, having established themselves, would follow Mr. Brandeis' example and resign from private practice and turn around and represent

some of the public interests that otherwise do not have the funds to have
representation. I'd be interested in
any comment the speakers would like
to make regardingthat.
MR. KRASH: Some of the great figures in the law have been men who
have stood up in moments of great
difficulty and argued and handled unpopular causes. That was certainly
true during the 50's, at the time of the
loyalty and security program. I think,
however, that many of the really admirable things are done by people
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